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deny independent checkweighmen and cash wages was the immediate catalyst 
for the rebellion. As Shapiro rightly notes, the miners did not attack the state 
directly; nor did they march on operators' headquarters. Instead, miners struck 
at a vulnerable spot - the convict lease, a blurry boundary between state and 
corporation. In the early years of the modem American bureaucratic state, the 
miners developed a strategy that turned a nascent regulatory apparatus against 
capital to damage operators financially. Simultaneously miners rallied 
community support, lobbied legislators, and worked to control their public 
image in the press. From the late twentieth century, this campaign looks 
remarkably like the "comprehensive" campaigns increasingly waged by 
American unions, in which labour marshals government regulatory agencies, 
community coalitions, corporate finance tactics, and political allies to pressure 
employers to recognize and bargain with unions. And modem comprehensive 
campaigns similarly aim at the interstices of state and corporate power - tax 
subsidies, government contracts, and the like - to wrest state power into 
labour's service. That American workers in the twenty first century must 
resurrect the tactics of 1890s miners is a telling commentary. What better 
illustrates the deterioration of American labour rights? 
Jennifer Luff 
College of William and Mary 
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Fred Siegel, The Future Once Happened Here: New York, D.C., L.A., and the 
Fate ofAmerica h Big Cities (New York: The Free Press, 1998). 
At the dawn of the millennium, scholars and social pundits alike have been 
scrambling to understand why the second half of the twentieth century 
witnessed the wholesale decline of American inner cities. How could it be that 
many thriving American metropolises of the 1940s and 1950s devolved into 
crime-ridden, economically devastated, wastelands by the 1980s? How could it 
be that poverty is even higher now than it was thirty years ago, that race 
relations are as polarized as ever, and that inner cities are the very last place 
one might look for business vitality? Many who tackle this question believe 
that the answer lies in an analysis of the grand socioeconomic experiment that 
began in the mid-1960s called the "Great Society." It was, after all, the Great 
Society liberals who made it their mission to eliminate America's urban woes, 
to end poverty nationwide an4 as importantly, to address once and for all the 
brutality of racial discrimination both de jure and de facto. 
Historian-turned-journalist Frederick Siegel has embarked on just such an 
inquiry in his recent book, The Future Once Happened Here. This is not 
Siegel's first foray into this subject. His caustic treatment of the Great Society 
130 Left History 7.1 
experiment in his earlier book, Troubled Journey: From Pearl Harbor to 
Ronald Reagan, earned him the appellation "neoliberal." And though Siegel 
takes the time to assert his still-liberal credentials in his new book (by noting, 
for example, that famed socialist and poverty expert Michael Harrington was 
one of his good friends and that he actually lives in New York City), his 
moniker now might well be that of full-fledged conservative. What ostensibly 
begins as a thoughtful and scholarly examination of inner city decline, 
escalates into a harangue on African American culture as well as the poor and 
public sector unions, and ends with an unabashed call for the return of 
unbridled free-market capitalism to cure urban ills. 
Siegel's book takes the reader into the bowels of three major American 
cities, New York, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles, to make the overarching 
case that, because sixties liberals corrupted what was good about New Deal 
liberalism, it was they who sent inner cities into an seemingly intractable 
downward spiral. Sixties liberalism, Siegel maintains, demonized the work 
ethic, deregulated morals, encouraged economic dependency, fostered crime, 
and smothered economic initiative. While Siegel concedes that these liberals 
began with the best of intentions, he argues that eventually they were 
blackmailed by militant black nationalist zealots whose constant threat of civil 
disorder held liberal politicians and policy makers hostage to the very people 
whom they so wanted to help. Because of their fear of riots, and fear of being 
labeled racists, sixties liberals ultimately fostered both "social license and 
economic restrictions" (xi) and, thus, "the great causes of thirty years ago have 
degenerated into a series of squalid shakedowns." (235) 
To prove this controversial contention, Siegel first traces New York City's 
history from its New Deal roots through the high point of the Great Society's 
War on Poverty. It was then, he suggests, that the "consensus" upon which New 
Deal Liberalism had been erected shattered as black militants and white leftists 
alike bullied their own self-interested and myopic agenda to the policy fore. 
New York was never the same, Siegel argues, after the chaotic battles of the 
1960s such as that over community control in Ocean-Hill Brownsville or the 
disorder designed to make welfare more accessible to the poor that gripped 
NYC in the mid-1970s. (32,44, 53) Before long, crime was out of control, the 
city government became increasingly dependent on federal dollars and 
taxation to support its "underclass" who wanted welfare not work, and social 
pathology flourished alienating "workaday business people" and private 
investors alike. 
In D.C. the tale of decline is even more sordid since the District never had 
a real New Deal tradition (nor a solid white working class to clamor for it), so 
its tumultuous dnve for statehood was founded on the alienating principles of 
black nationalism and supported blindly by Great Society liberals. According 
to Siegel, D.C. mayor Marion Barry was a black nationalist who played upon 
fears of black insurrection to create a shameful regime of personal excess and 
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corruption, fiscal mismanagement, and social chaos. (61) The longer that 
Barry ruled, the further that the principles of Great Society liberalism 
atrophied fueling greater poverty, propelling a wholly incompetent black 
middle class leadership to power, weakening the D.C. police department with 
budget cuts and collapsing standards, and creating a center of crime and racial 
entitlement that sent law-abiding citizens scurrying for the affluent suburbs. 
For Siegel D.C. is the example par excellence of what happens when liberal 
plans to aid the poor and adjust racial imbalances are taken to the extreme and 
administered by incompetent but threatening Black Power hacks. 
In Los Angeles Siegel finds a more complicated and slightly less 
depressing story. The fact that L.A. has a large Asian and Hispanic immigrant 
population, which has been willing to work for low wages in an attempt to inch 
up the ladder of success, leads Siegel to argue that there are clearly "different 
ways to be poor" (1 16-1 17). The poor can attempt to grab the opportunity that 
America has to offer through hard work and sacrifice like these recent 
immigrants do (and older immigrants did), or they can scream and threaten for 
greater governmental assistance and reject the values and cultural norms of the 
larger society as do the "South Central gangsters" and the "gang apologist[s]" 
like Congresswoman Maxine Waters. (138, 140-141) 
According to Siegel, however, the problem for America's urban centers is 
that its poor blacks are unlikely to follow the immigrant model. Inner city 
blacks have roots in Southern "tobacco country," which imbibes them with a 
"tradition of violence" that is hard to shake, and they are further handicapped 
because they come from generations of sharecroppers, who "were largely 
excluded from the discipline and self control imposed by industrial and 
bureaucratic work." (5, 26) Instead of behaving like other immigrants, Siegel 
suggests, blacks have been "largely left to cultivate their bitterness" (26) and 
are ever ready to blame others for their shortcomings. When black "gangsters 
and murderers," who see themselves as "black heroes and revolutionaries," 
(142-143) continue to engender fear and engage in crime, middle class 
homeowners such as those in L.A. are alienated and the viability of the city is 
compromised. (142-143) But sadly, according to Siegel, even the hard working 
immigrants contribute to L.A.'s urban problems. As he puts it, "you can't 
reduce poverty by continuously importing more poor people" and it is 
unrestricted immigration itself which erodes the possibilities for a healthy 
economy with viable wages by, among other things, causing the proliferation 
of sweatshops. (1 52, 155) Additionally, because L.A. is so multi-ethnic, efforts 
to promote a "common" culture and a "shared set of civic values" are always 
thwarted. (xi) Because L.A. is not as willing to kow tow to the threats of the 
black nationalists as are other cities (the L.A. Riot, Siegel points out, was not 
followed by a new influx of federal aid), and because it is more willing to 
promote new high-tech industries, L.A. is better positioned than both D.C. and 
New York to escape the sixties liberal legacy of dependency and inefficiency. 
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Siegel's book ends back in New York City where he chronicles what he 
sees is the ultimate fall-out of sixties liberalism through a series of graphic 
anecdotes. Siegel details individual cases of deranged homeless people 
offending and scaring law-abiding citizens, of black militants using anti- 
Semitism and gruesome violence to extract personal gain, and of teen mothers 
who have all of the aid that they possibly could need but still live the morally 
and culturally degenerate lives that led to their poverty in the first place. 
According to Siegel, "despite unparalleled spending, poverty has grown; more 
importantly it had deepened as shorter and shorter generations of 
dysfunctional family fragments reproduced themselves." (210) Lest there be 
any doubt that these New York atrocities are directly connected to the social 
and economic policies of the 1960s, Siegel tries to show that it is the liberal 
programs themselves which caused these unsavory events and that the liberal 
"do gooders" actually became dependent on the continuation of dysfunction 
and poverty so that they could remain employed and secure. As he puts it, 
"poverty programs that were created to bring minorities in to the economic 
mainstream have over the years metastasized in to an alternative economy" 
fiercely protected by social workers and public sector employees alike. (2 12) 
Following his city-by-city analysis of national urban collapse, and his 
recounting of grisly New York anecdotes, Siegel concludes with the sweeping 
statement that "urban liberalism died not because the federal government was 
insufficiently generous [as numerous well-respected economists and historians 
have argued] but because the money that was sent for social services sowed the 
seeds of self-destruction." (239) The self-destruction to which Siegel refers 
included the social and moral degeneracy of the inner city black family (59-60, 
96), the refusal of the poor - particularly poor blacks - to work "dead end 
jobs" preferring to sponge off of welfare (218), the rise in homelessness not 
because there was any lack of decent housing but because of the homeless's 
own personal distress and dysfunction (182), and finally the disastrous baiting 
and threatening of well-intentioned middle and working class whites by 
"fascist," "gangster," black nationalists (and the moral degeneracy which they 
promoted) which sent whites, and their tax base, fleeing to the suburbs. (1 70) 
The future is, however, not doomed. According to Siegel, by seriously 
considering immigrant restriction and anti-affirmative action legislation such 
as the controversial California Civil Rights Initiative (155, 166), by cutting 
welfare (247), by reigning in the excesses of over-paid and lazy public sector 
employees (198, 201, 203), and by insisting upon the poor's greater 
inculturation into time-honored "American" values of social and personal 
responsibility (134), we can finally create "the possibility for business 
expansion and new jobs" that our cities need. (247) As Siegel sees it, "the 
promise of inner city economic development draws on the now-forgotten 
arguments for capitalism." (238) 
Significantly, the path that Siegel suggests American inner cities take to 
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redeem themselves is fully dependent upon an acceptance of his particular 
version of what went wrong between 1964 and 1994 -a version that time and 
again confuses cause and effect an4 even more problematically, completely 
ignores the numerous historical and economic findings of recent years which 
strongly undermine his analysis. 
Take, for instance, Siegel's key opening premise that black militants 
shattered the "consensus" upon which New Deal liberalism was erected, thus 
alienating working and middle class whites and pushing liberal policy makers 
to abandon the New Deal's recognition that there are worthy and unworthy 
poor people. (46) It is difficult to see how Siegel can make this case in light of 
recent works on the urban center such as Tom Sugrue's The Origins of Urban 
Crisis or Arnold Hirsch's not so recent The Making of a Second Ghetto. Each 
of these historians clearly show, through painstaking and sophisticated 
research, that this notion of "consensus" is largely a myth; one that obscures 
the depth of African American exclusion from opportunity and equality just as 
it overlooks the preponderance of brutal acts committed by urban whites 
determined to maintain control of the city and its liberal coalition. Even a 
cursory reading of the best recent history on the city would indicate that all 
clearly was not "fine" until the black militants came along to exploit a situation 
to their unfair advantage. Similarly, it is difficult to reconcile Siegel's reverence 
for the New Deal State's differentiation between the "deserving" and the 
"undeserving" poor in light of the recent spate of excellent historical 
monographs on both poverty and welfare. How can Siegel celebrate the glory 
days of New Deal welfare selectivity, engage in a caricaturing of the culture of 
the poor or, for that matter, even employ the term "underclass" when historians 
like Michael Katz and Linda Gordon, not to mention the fine scholars in 
Katz's' recent volume The Underclass Debate, have problematized each of 
those notions beyond redemption? 
And what of Siegel's argument about the causes and consequences of 
urban rioting from the 1960s to the present day? His contention that riots were 
the highly effective tools first of Black Power extremists, and then of gangster 
thugs masquerading as political rebels, to extract more hand-outs from guilt- 
ridden liberals seems nothing short of bizarre if one were to even glance at the 
detailed information on urban riots recently offered in edited collections such 
as Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban 
Uprising or Mark Baldasarre, ed., The Los Angeles Riots: Lessons of the 
Urban Future. It is as if Siegel has willfully ignored the preponderance of 
evidence indicating that the L.A. Riot was, as Mike Davis puts it, "a major 
post-modern bread riot" which erupted in response to the extreme economic 
evisceration of South Central L.A. that had taken place after 1980.' Perhaps 
Siegel would do well to grapple not only with the boon of statistical and 
analytical information available in the recent riot historiography but also with 
the analyses of "gangsters" offered by scholars such as Robin D.G. Kelley and 
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Mike Davis in much more intellectual depth that he is able to provide.2 At the 
very least, given his particular "take" on the motivations of urban rioters, 
Siegel should account for the detailed findings of scholars like Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant that, in fact, "the L.A. riot was not simply a black affairv3 
The one indisputable fact that Siegel does pin most of his larger arguments 
on, however, is that poverty did indeed rise dramatically in between the mid- 
1970s and the mid-1990s. Yet while Siegel suggests that this is evidence of the 
failures of sixties social welfare policy, virtually every economist and historian 
who has taken the time to track the political and economic changes that took 
place between 1974 and 1994 sees a notable disengagement from a 
commitment to welfare spending, a greater concentration of wealth into the 
hands of America's elite, a process of devastating de-industrialization that 
began not during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson but rather during that of 
Eisenhower, a consistently falling annual wage rate, and a significant drop in 
the number of living-wage jobs available in the inner city between 1974 and 
1994. None of these devastating poverty-inducing realities were caused by 
sixties liberals, indeed the majority of them are evidence of the extraordinary 
backlash to sixties liberalism that was taking place no sooner had the ink dried 
on the Economic Opportunity legislation. 
Siegel too conveniently ignores the statistical findings of economists like 
Rhonda WiHiams that in L.A., for example, "the earnings of young black men 
relative to their white counterparts declined at every educational level between 
1973 and 1989" or that "over 50% of young black and Latino high-school 
graduates earned less than the two-adult, two-child, poverty-level hourly wage 
in 1989, a dramatic increase from the late 1970s."~ Most interestingly, in his 
zest to finger sixties liberals for the rise of poverty, Siegel ignores the fact that 
between 1978 and 1982, there were massive plant closings in Los Angeles 
County and, simultaneously, that there was a wholesale "defunding of 
community-based initiatives and other safety-net programs" which left those 
laid off with little to sustain them.5 Finally, and most importantly, Siegel 
completely ignores the key fact that it was "Republicans [who] have been in 
the White House for all but four (the Carter Years) of the past twenty years" 
during which the greatest increases in poverty, crime, and urban devastation 
took place.6 
Just as Siegel fundamentally misunderstands the roots of escalating 
poverty between 1974 and 1994, he similarly misunderstands why crime, 
homelessness, decriminalization and de-institutionalization also rose during 
these years. For Siegel it is as if crime sprang out of nowhere in the 1980s. 
(160) In his estimation, the poor became more of a criminal element as the 
20th century progressed because they were dependent on welfare. Again, one 
can only wonder if Siegel has read the vast literature which chronicles the 
direct connection between the erosion of a living wage economy (as well as 
cuts in social welfare) and the escalation of the illegal economy of drugs and 
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guns. Is it coincidental that the teens who used to have summer jobs through 
federal funds were replaced by teens selling crack when those funds so 
completely dried up in the 1980s? How can Siegel ignore the connections 
between the decrease in affordable, federally-subsidized housing, the virtual 
explosion of the high-priced private real estate market in the speculative 1980s, 
the de-industrialization of virtually every urban center, and the dramatic rise of 
homelessness - including family homelessness - during that same decade? 
How did the "do gooders" cause this? Similarly, and perhaps most curiously, 
how is it that the sixties liberals should be blamed for the rise in the numbers 
of mentally ill Americans who now are roaming the streets, or criminals who 
often are released prematurely or never incarcerated at all? Not only is his 
evidence for this purely anecdotal, it literally ignores the fact that is was during 
the budget slashing 1980s that mental hospitals (notably those whose patients 
were on General Assistance) were forced to close their doors and that it was 
only when the viable wage economy was replaced by the drug economy (and 
the penal system became overloaded) that suspended sentences and premature 
probation became unavoidable. Siegel's claim that decriminalization was the 
product of "reformers straining to be hip" (174) is nothing short of hysterical. 
Time and again in this book Siegel disregards the spate of historical and 
economic evidence that not only would challenge his conclusions, but would 
actually render the premises which underlie them invalid. Because Siegel 
chooses to ignore this literature, his prescriptions for a better future are hard to 
swallow. In the end we are indeed persuaded that he, personally, is disgusted 
by the poor, by black urban culture, by public sector employees, and with 
sixties liberals, (because these personal feelings so obviously fuel his page-by- 
page rant) but he never is able to persuade the reader that what disgusts him 
was actually caused by the sixties liberal experiment itself. Siegel disparages 
the "Old Believers" who still maintain that capitalism in inherently exploitative 
and, thus, that it is the government's job not only to regulate the capitalists, but 
also to provide aid for those chewed up, spit out, or overlooked by them. If 
Siegel would stop even for a minute to read the wealth of material on "what 
went wrong" that he is so suspicious of, if he would look carefully at the 
numerous European social democracies which spend far more social welfare, 
yet have far less crime, than America ever did, and finally if he would look 
more critically at the laissez-faire 19th century capitalist world that he now 
promotes, even he might see the deep analytical flaws in The Future Once 
Happened Here. 
Heather Ann Thompson 
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Bonnie G. Smith, The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical 
Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
In 1929, Virginia Woolf recorded - in A Room of One Own - that "what 
one wants ... is a mass of information" about women's lives in the past. 
Looking on the library shelves for the "books that were not there," she 
wondered if some brilliant student at Newnham or Girton might not supply a 
history of women to supplement the history of men; in an even more ambitious 
move, Woolf suggested that such a student might even rewrite history itself. In 
the last decades, an explosion of interest in the history of women and of gender 
within the academy has begun to supply the "books that were not there" when 
Woolf wrote her essay almost seventy years ago. Where Woolf found only 
empty shelves, we can now find - in most if not all university libraries - 
rows and rows of books. In The Gender of History, however, Bonnie Smith 
suggests a new context in which to read Woolf's complaint. The books Woolf 
wanted were "not there," Smith's study implies, not because they had not been 
written, but because a university library was the wrong place to look for them. 
And the brilliant students of Newnham and Girton were not necessarily the 
ones to write them. 
The assumption that most of the history written in the last two centuries 
has been written by and about men depends, Smith argues, on the assumption 
that the only history worth talking about is "professional" history, history 
written from within the academy and to the exacting standards of professional 
scholarship. On the contrary, Smith points out, women have had a lively 
interest in the writing of history since at least the eighteenth century. Women 
have, however written history as amateurs and not necessarily for a scholarly 
audience. The emergence of history as a scientific, professional discipline, 
according to Smith, was predicated on the discrediting of this amateur 
historical vision. The "founding practices" of the historical profession were 
themselves implicated in a gendered hierarchy. The historical profession, in 
effect, emerged not just without women but in opposition to them and to what 
